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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE E. HOLMES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
District Court No. C-78-681 
Supreme Court No. 16549 
DeGRAFF ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Bruce E. Holmes (hereafter 
"Holmes"), brought an action claiming entitlement to a real 
estate commission for the sale of certain property owned by the 
defendant-respondent, DeGraff Associates (hereafter "DeGraff 
Associates"). Respondent asserted counterclaims based on 
breach of contract, fraudulent representation, and intentional 
and malicious false accusations. Trial was held May 16 and 17, 
1979. The trial court awarded judgment on the complaint to 
respondent and to appellant on the counterclaims. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant prays that the Court rewerse the trial 
court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in-
sofar as Holmes was found not be entitled to the real estate 
commission, that the trial court be instructed to enter judg-
ment in favor of Holmes in the amount of his portion of the 
real estate commission, and that Holmes be awarded his costs on 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the months of May, June, and July of 1977, the 
period in which the dispute arose, Holmes and DeGraff Asso-
ciates were both members of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
(hereafter "Board of Realtors" or "Board") (R. 3), a voluntary 
association of r•al estate brokers and sales agents, and both 
were members of the Board's Multiple Listing Service (sometimes 
referred to herein as "MLS") (Exhibits 3-P, 4-P, 10-P, 12-P, 
15-P). This service provides a means by which members may sub-
mit "sell listings" for publication in the weekly MLS catalog 
and exposure to other members. Holmes and DeGraff Associates 
had signed agreements to be bound by the rules and regulations 
of the Board of Realtors (Exhibits 2-P and 12-P). Holmes and 
DeGraff Associates had each signed "commisson split" agreements 
with the Board of Realtors (Exhibits 3-P and 15-P). The com-
mission split agreements provide for the manner or percentage 
of split between brokers of the comission earned upon sale of a 
property listed with the Multiple Listing Service. The agree-
ments provide, in material part, that DeGraff Associates would 
pay a "selling broker" 60 percent of the commission upon the 
sale of a property listed by DeGraff Associates (Answer to 
Request for Admission No. 5, R. 75, Exhibits 3-P and 15-P). 
The listing broker completes a form, entitled "Lots 
and Acreage Form," and submits it to the Multiple Listing 
Service for publication in the MLS weekly catalog. The form 
includes inf·ormation regarding the location and size of the 
( 2) 
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property, the listing broker, the asking price and terms, if 
any, and the amount of the commission. 
A listing broker is one who negotiates a listing con-
tract, entitled Sales Agency Contract, with the seller. The 
selling broker is the one who finds the buyer, introduces him 
to the property, generates an offer to purchase that property 
from the buyer or the client and then in turn presents that 
offer to the seller through the listing agent, ultimately con-
cluding in the seller accepting the offer and the buyer and 
seller consummate the transaction accordingly. 
When two brokers -- the listing broker and the selling 
broker -- are involved in a transaction which is consummated in 
the sale of the property, the sales commission as published in 
the listing agreement is split between the two brokers accord-
ing to agreements submitted by them to the Multiple Listing 
Service (Tr. 7-8} . 
The agreements filed with the Board cover a situation 
between a broker who is selling the property as a principal and 
a broker who is buying the property as a principal (Tr. 12}. 
DeGraff Associates authorized Clara DeGraff to list 
certain property located in Salt Lake County and owned by De-
Graff Associates (Tr. 47}. DeGraff Associates signed a Sales 
Agency Contract authorizing the listing, offer for sale, and 
sale of certain property (hereafter the "property"} located in 
Salt Lake County, owned by DeGraff Associates (Answer, para-
graph 2, R. 7, in response to paragraph 3 of plaintiff's corn-
plaint} . DeGraff Associates agreed to pay a six percent corn-
( 3} 
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mission upon the sale of the property {Answer to Request for 
Admission No. 2, R. 74). The Sales Agency Contract was to 
expire on its terms September 18, 1977 {Tr. 61). 
The Sales Agency'Contract provides, in part: 
Should said property be sold, leased or exchanged 
within three months after such expiration to any party to 
whom the property was offered or shown by me or you, or any 
other party during the term of this listing, I agree to pay 
you ~he commission above stated. 
Clara DeGraff completed the Lots and Acreage Form {see 
reserve side of Exhibit 9-P) and submitted it to the Multiple 
Listing Service for publication in the MLS catalog. 
The multiple listing catalog of May 6, 1977, included 
as Entry No. 63,000, page 86 {Exhibit 7-P), the property con-
cerned here, described as "206 +" acres in Kearns, at a total 
price of $1,421,170. Broker's commission was shown as six 
percent. 
On May 13, 1977, DeGraff Associates signed a Non-Sale 
Agreement regarding the property which provides, in material 
part: 
In consideration of your agreement to remove the list-
ing of my property, located at 5600 West 6200 South, 206 + 
acres of land, from the files of the Multiple Listing Ser-
vice of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors, and its member 
offices, and your further agreement to withhold your ef-
forts to secure a buyer for said property, I agree to pay 
you the commission as per listing contract in the event the 
said property is sold by myself, or any other person, firm 
or corporation. 
Sometime toward the end of May, 1977, Holmes contact-
ed Clara DeGraff, the licensed broker of DeGraff Associates, ~ i 
telephone to inquire about the property listed by DeGraff Asso-
ciates in the May 6, 1977 MLS catalog. Later, Holmes tele-
{4) 
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phoned Clara DeGraff again and asked more specifically about 
the property. When questioned as to whether it was still 
available, Clara DeGraff testified that though it had been 
withdrawn from the market, there had been discussions with 
others who had called expressing an interest. 
Holmes and Clara DeGraff negotiated regarding the 
terms of sale, which negotiations culminated in Clara DeGraff 
signing and delivering to Holmes, an Option (Exhibit D-24) 
dated June 17, 1977. Its terms included a total purchase price 
of $7,000 per acre for approximately 205 acres with $100,000 
cash down on July 15, 1977 and $100,000 or more annually there-
after until paid in full, with interest on the unpaid balance 
at the rate of eight percent per annum. The option was for a 
period of seven days from its execution. Paragraph 8 of the 
option provides: 
The Seller recognizes HOLMES REALTY Real Estate Com-
pany (Broker and Agent) through its salesmen BRUCE E. 
HOLMES, as the Real Estate Broker with whom Seller listed 
this property for sale and Seller agrees to pay commission 
to said Broker equal to -0-% of the gross sales price; and 
Seller hereby authorizes the agent to withhold such commis-
sion from the proceeds of sale at time of closing. 
The terms "Holmes Realty" and "Bruce E. Holmes" were typed onto 
the standard form. The term "-0-" was handwritten. 
On the same day trye option was signed, Holmes had con-
versations with Clara DeGraff and Jay DeGraff. Holmes testi-
fied regarding those conversations as follows: 
Q. What is the basis of your statement regarding their 
refusal to honor the option? 
( 5) 
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A. From the very day that I obtained the option they told 
me they would not honor it and I don't think it was 
two or three hours after I got it signed that I got a 
call from Clara DeGraff waiting for me at my home and 
I called her up and talked to her about it. 
Q. That was on the day of the option, June 17th? 
A. That was on the day the option was signed. 
Q. And what was the conversation? 
A. That her husband had seen the option and that he was 
very upset about it and she was sort of in a bind and 
could I help her out, that her husband would not 
accept the terms of the option as it was written. 
Q. What was your response? 
A. My response was well, why don't I come out and we'll 
talk about it, don't get upset, we'll talk about it 
and see what the deal is, something to that effect. 
Q. What was the next contact you had with DeGraff Asso-
ciates? 
A. I believe it was later on that evening and I can't 
pinpoint the exact day or time for certain but I talk-
ed with Jay DeGraff. I believe I talked with him and 
talked with him at home about the same subject matter 
... ,he ... told me that that option was not worth 
(sic) the paper it was written on, that his wife was 
not authorized to sign for the corporation -- I don't 
remember if he brought up the fact it was written in 
perpetuity or in subsequent conversation but it did 
come up from him and from the very day that I got the 
option they told me they would not honor it. 
Q. Now you refer to perpetuity. What do you mean by that 
or what was meant by that? 
A. Well, I didn't know for sure what it meant and I am 
still not entirely sure what it means. I think it 
means that there is no date that it is going to be 
paid off. 
Q. Is that the term that Mr. DeGraff used? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. 120-22) 
(6) 
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Clara DeGraff testified regarding the response of her 
husband, Jay DeGraff, upon reading the option: 
Q. What did he say about the option? 
A. He read it through and when he finished he said do you 
realize that this is -- that contract exercise of this 
option provides a contract that can never be paid out 
and he asked me how it came to be and I told him Mr. 
Holmes had prepared it and he. said there would have to 
be some kind of changes in order fo•r the -- so that 
eventually the contract would pay out. 
Q. In fact he said he wasn't going to sell the property 
on that option did he not? 
A. No, he did not. 
MR. PETTY: Your honor, may the deposition of 
Mrs. DeGraff be published? 
Whereupon the deposition of Clara DeGraff was published, and 
read as follows: 
MR. PETTY: 
THE COURT: 
Well, let me begin on page 8. Bottom of 
page 8. Question, and I show you what is 
marked as Exhibit 21 which is attached ~o 
the deposition of J. DeGraff. Is that the 
option? Answer: It appears to be. Ques-
tion: And was it signed by you on 17th of 
June, 1977? Answer: Yes. Question: What 
was the next communication that you had with 
Mr. Holmes? Answer: As soon as my husband 
came back to the office that afternoon and 
saw the option he was very upset with it and 
--Question: What did he say? Answer: He 
wasn't going to sell that property under 
that type of an option and I told him what 
had transpired, that we tried to get a hold 
of him and had been unsuccessful and he said 
that under no circumstances would this type 
of an option or type of circumstance would 
go to fruition because of the nature of the 
option. I called Mr. Holmes and told him 
that. Was that your testimony that day? 
Yes, that was her testimony. This is a 
deposition; it has been signed and filed so 
that was her testimony. That is how she 
testified at that time. 
(7) 
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Q. Was that true? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. 93-94) 
Holmes assigned the option to American Equity Corpo-
ration (Tr. 43), which retained Holmes to complete negotiations 
and consummate an agreement with DeGraff Associates (Exhibit 
38-P) in beha·lf' of American Equity. 
American Equity Corporation requested Holmes to exer-
cise the option (Exhibit 37-P). American Equity Corporation 
subsequently assigned its interest in the Op~ion to its affil-
iate, American Development Company. 
Holmes exercised the option in accordance with its 
terms by sending DeGraff Associates a letter dated June 23, 
1977 (Ex. 25-D). Upon receipt of the notice of exercise, Clara 
DeGraff called Holmes and expressed concern that Holmes intend-
ed to close on the option (Tr. 123). Holmes had several dis-
cussions with Jay DeGraff wherein Holmes attempted to negotiate 
a new agreement which would be satisfactory to DeGraff Asso-
ciates (Tr. 122, 123) . The negotiations were unsuccessful. In 
a letter dated July 11, 1977, Holmes reiterated that he was 
exercising the option and set the closing date for July 14, 
1977, at Security Title Company (Ex. 27-D). Between July 11 
and 14, Holmes met with Jay DeGraff and Craig DeGraff in an 
effort to negotiate an agreement satisfactory to DeGraff Asso-
ciates (Tr. 124). During this time, from June 17 to July 14, 
Jay DeGraff consistently refused to honor the option and told 
Holmes the option was not worth a thing (Tr. 125). Holmes had 
( 8) 
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a conversation with counsel for DeGraff Associates regarding 
the validity of the option: 
Q. The question again was what was said about the option 
and by whom, would you tell us the conversation and 
who said what with regard to the option. 
A. Mr. Sabin outlined several reasons why that option was 
not valid. The one that remains in my mind is that it 
was written .as he called it in perpetuity and he ex-
plained to me what that meant a little bit. He also 
mentioned several other reasons and I don't think I 
can itemize those but there was -- there were about 
four or five reasons all together why he considered 
that option invalid as written and therefore, the 
DeGraffs could not be held to it. That is what he was 
telling me. 
(Tr. 147-48) 
As to his view of the legal effect of the option, Jay 
DeGraff testified: 
Q. What was your personal position on behalf of -- well, 
with respect to whether or not you considered that 
option binding prior to the time that the closing of 
the sale actually took place? 
A. We never had any questions as to whether we had a 
binding agreement with the option and that it would 
culiminate in a final contract which would negotiate 
transfer of title. 
Q. Now, there are differences, are there not in some of 
the terms of the final contract of sale under the 
option? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
As has been testified, Mr. Sabin, I picked up on the 
fact that we had a contract here that was never going 
to be paid out because the interest alone. 
What was your understanding, Mr. DeGraff as to the 
document that was being utilized for purposes of clos-
ing the sale? 
The option was a bona fide d0cument, a binding agree-
ment and we kept going on with the negotiations in 
pursuit of it. 
(Tr. 131-32) 
(9) 
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On cross examination, Mr. DeGraff testified further 
regarding the option: 
Q. Mr. DeGraff, did you consider that there was a 
requirement for a subsequent contract of sale after 
the option was signed? 
A. I considered the option to be an ongoing, leading to a 
contractual passing of title. 
Q. You considered that the terms of the option had to be 
expanded, clarified or redefined or renegotiated? 
A. That has been said repeatedly. We talked about that. 
Q. I am asking you if that was your treatment, your 
attitude for this option? 
A. Certainly was. The option was binding with the 
exception of the fact that we had something that was 
never going to be paid off here. 
Q. And that wasn't binding? 
A. Well, how can you have a contract that doesn't have an 
end to it? 
Q. That is what I am asking of you. Can you or can't you? 
A. Well, you can't 
(Tr. 138-39) 
On July 14, 1977, Holmes wrote a letter (Exhibit 29-D) 
as follows: 
This is not the contract that I had ready for the 
"closing" at 3 P.M. according to the terms expressed in the 
option you granted to me. However, as you have expressed a 
desire to make changes in the terms but haven't yet given 
me any specific suggestions, I'm submitting this contract 
as an alternative which I believe will be satisfactory to 
the both of us. 
This letter was delivered to DeGraff Associates by Bruce 
Holmes, together with a form of contract which showed American 
Development Company as buyer (Tr. ~?7). 
(10) 
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Holmes and Glen Saxton of American Development Company 
appeared at the closing scheduled for July 14, 1977. No one 
from DeGraff Associates attended. That afternoon in a conver-
sation with Craig DeGraff, the terms of an agreement were nego-
' 
tiated by DeGraff Associates and American Development Company, 
through Craig DeGraff and Bruce Holmes, respectively (Tr. 
113). DeGraff Associates executed the purchase agreement at 
Security Title Company on the following day, July 15, 1977. 
The terms of that Agreement between DeGraff Associates 
and American Development Company (Exhibit 17-P) provides for a 
purchase price of $1,435,000, $74,500 paid concurrent with the 
execution of the agreement and the balance of $1,360,000 as 
follows: 
$50,000 on or before July 31, 1978; $50,000 on or 
before September 30, 1978; $50,000 on or before July 31st 
of each year thereafter and $50,000 on or before September 
30th of each year thereafter, until balance due Seller is 
paid in full. 
In addition, American Development Company agreed to assume and 
pay the underlying contract to Farnsworth and Associates, 
DeGraff Associates' contract seller. Reference is made to the 
agreement for other terms. 
Executed concurrently with the Agreement (Exhibit 
17-P) were several other documents: Assignment of Contract 
(Exhibit 19-P), Supplemental Agreement (Exhibit 21-P), Escrow 
Instructions (Exhibit 20-P), Warranty Deed (Exhibit 18-P), and 
a Seller's and Buyer's Escrow Statement (Exhibit 22-P). The 
Seller's Escrow Statement (Exhibit 22-P) was the only one of 
these documents to refer to the broker's commission. It is a 
(11) 
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standard form, itemizing Buyer's deductions from the total 
selling price. One of these itemizations reads, "Real Estate 
Commission Due" with a blank space for the name of the broker 
and another blan~ space for the sum. In the first blank space 
was typed "Holmes Realty," and in the second "in arbi tra-
tion."1 This statement was signed by J. W. DeGraff. 
The property listed by DeGraff Associates was sold to 
American Development Company within the term of the Sales 
Agency Contract (Answer to Request for Admission No. 3, R. 74, 
lon July 12, 1977, Holmes wrote to the Salt Lake Board of 
Realtors (Exhibit 31-D), requesting arbitration of Holmes' 
claim for a commission. DeGraff Associates was provided a copy 
of Holmes' letter and responded to the Board of Realtors (the 
record does not contain the response, but it is referred to in 
Exhibit 30-D). Holmes responded to DeGraff Associates by let-
ter dated July 20, 1977 to the Board of Realtors (Exhibit 
30-D). Holmes sought to pursue the matter by arbitration, but 
DeGraf~ Associates would not agree to binding arbitration (Tr. 
90) and would not sign the Arbitration Agreement (Exhibit 32-D) 
of the Board of Realtors (Tr. 91). 
Prior to amendment of §78-31-1, U.C.A., in 1977 which 
allowed agreement "to submit to arbitration any controversy 
which may arise in the future," an agreement to arbitrate a 
future dispute was unenforceable. Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 
108 U. 364, 160 P.2d 421 (1945), Shumaker v. Utex Exploration 
Co., 157 F.Supp. 68 (D. Utah 1957). 
Section 4 of Article VI of the Multiple Listing Ser-
vice Rules and Regulations (Exhibit 6-P) reads, in part, as 
follows: 
Section 4. An Arbitration Committee of nine members 
shall be appointed by the Directors pursuant to the Consti-
tution and By-Laws of the Board. This committee will arbi-
trate disputes between members . . . 
The agreements of Holmes (Exhibit 12-P) and DeGraff 
Associates (Exhibit 2-P) to abide by the Rules and Regulations 
of the Multiple Listing Service were signed before the effect-
ive date of the Amendment to §78-31-1. 
(12) 
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Ex. 17-P, Tr.61). American Development Company has performed 
all of its obligations under the Real Estate Contract (Tr. 
52). Holmes introduced American Development Company to the 
property (Tr. 32, 57). The Agreement (Exhibit 17) between 
DeGraff Associates and American Development Company was nego-
tiated by Bruce Holmes (Tr. 34). All of American Development 
Company's information regarding the property was through Bruce 
Holmes (Tr. 35). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DeGRAFF ASSOCIATES REPUDIATED THE OPTION. 
The Option was signed by Clara DeGraff on June 17, 
1977. On the same day, just hours after the Option was signed, 
Clara DeGraff called Holmes and told him that DeGraff Asso-
ciates would not abide by the Option as written (Tr. 93, 94, 
121). Later that same day, Holmes had a conversation with Jay 
DeGraff during which Jay DeGraff told Holmes that the "option 
was not worth the paper it was written on, that his wife was 
not authorized to sign for the corporation" (Tr. 121). Holmes 
attempted to negotiate a new agreement with DeGraff Associates, 
during which time Jay DeGraff consistently refused to honor the 
option and told Holmes it was not worth a thing (Tr. 122, 123, 
125) . Counsel for DeGraff Associates told Holmes that the Op-
tion was not valid as written and that DeGraff Associates could 
not be held to it (Tr. 147-48). 
DeGraff Associates repudiated the option. Repudiation 
is the refusal to perform a duty or obligation owed to the 
(13) 
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other party. Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 U.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 
(1967). 
DeGraff Associates' repudiation was clear and unequi-
vocal -- it refused to perform on the terms and conditions of 
the Option as written. "[R)epudiation, where it is an express 
refusal to perform, must be positive and unequivocal." Simp-
son, Contracts, 387 .(2d Ed. 1965). The repudiation could not 
have been more clear, especially when measured against the Utah 
standard as announced in University Club v. Invesco Holding 
Corp., 29 U.2d 1, 504 P.2d 29 (1972). 
The trial court entered a Finding of Fact as follows: 
10. At all times from the date of execution of the 
Option Agreement until the date of final sale of the sub-
ject property, the Plaintiff considered and treated the 
Option Agreement as enforceable in effect and binding upon 
the Defendant. (R. 85) 
It is irrelevant how Holmes regarded the Option; DeGraff Asso-
ciates regarded it as unenforceable and repudiated it. Upon 
the repudiation, Holmes was entitled to certain legal rights 
(See Point II), regardless of how he regarded the Option. 
The repudiation of the payment terms constituted a 
repudiation of the entire Option: 
Where the breach is by express repudiation, such as a 
refusal of any further performance, not only is it total 
but also it cannot be treated as partial by the promissee 
in obtaining a judgment .... An express repudiation of the 
contract by the promissor is a single and total breach, and 
the promissee if he sues must claim the value of the entire 
contract in his action or the part not claimed is lost to 
him ... But if the circumstances accompanying the breach 
indicate that the promissor intends to render no further 
performance, then if the promissee sues at all he must re-
cover all his damages for the entire contract in one ac-
tion. Simpson, Contracts §188 (2d Ed. 1965). 
( 14) 
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Corbin describes the rights of an option holder as 
follows: 
[T]he holder of an option to buy land has a condi-
tional right to a conveyance, a power to turn that right 
into an unconditional right to immediate conveyance by 
performing the conditions, an immunity from revocation by 
the option giver, and the legal privilege of performing or 
not performing the conditions at his option. During the 
agreed term of his option, he has a right that the option 
giver shall not repudiate or make performance impossible or 
more difficult by conveying the land to a third person. , 
These rights are enforceable by all the usual judicial 
remedies, including judgment for damages, injunction, and 
decree for specific performance. Corbin, Contracts §272 
p.579. 
See also Knight v. Chamberlain, infra, footnote 3, p. 30. 
The rights of an option holder include tne right to 
sue for damages for wrongful repudiation, even though the 
option was not exercised prior to the breach. Saltman v. 
Dunham, 406 P.2d 153 (Ore. 1965); Fullington v. Penn Phillips 
Company, 395 P.2d 124 (Ore. 1964). 
Repudiation may or may not embrace the entire con-
tract. It does so only if the part repudiated is material to 
the undertaking. A refusal to perform is obviously material. 
More specifically, DeGraff Associates repudiated the payment 
terms. The payment terms of the Option were of such a substan-
tial nature that repudiation of those alone amounted to a sub-
stantial, material breach. 
In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 U.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 
(1967) , the court was asked to order specific performance of an 
earnest money agreement for the sale and conveyance of land. 
The court was concerned with the ambiguity of the terms of the 
earnest money agreement, most particularly the manner of pay-
(15) 
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ment. The importance of payment terms to a contract is appar-
ent from the Court's refusal in Pitcher to order specific per-
formance where the payment terms were uncertain. There was no 
uncertainty of terms in the Option, but it is equally clear 
that there could be no Option without terms of payment, which 
DeGraff Associates sought to avoid and expressly stated it 
would not abide by. 
In Bentzen v. H. N. Ranch, Inc., 320 P.2d 440 (Wyo. 
1958) , the parties had agreed that the balance payable in a 
land sale was to be determined by future agreement. It was as-
serted that the matter of payment was a mere detail. To this 
the court rejoined: 
As indicated by our numerous citations, we do not deem 
this so; and the question of the method of making deferred 
payments seems to be even more compelling in a sizable 
transaction wherein the method of amortization, the time to 
be consumed thereby, and the interest to be paid, are, from 
a practical standpoint, important and often controlling 
features. 
The court affirmed the trial court's determination that indefi-
nite terms of payment resulted in an incomplete and unenforce-
able contract. Utah courts recognize one exception to this 
general rule, that is, when it is used not "as a shield to pro-
teet a party from injustice, [but] as a weapon with which 
to perpetrate an injustice." Kier v. Condrack, 25 U.2d 139, 
478 P.2d 327, 330 (1970). In Kier the seller refused to per-
form an option contract on the grounds that it was uncertain 
and unenforceable in that payment terms were to be negotiated. 
The court held the option enforceable and made much of the 
seller's insistence on (1) an installment contract where 
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sellers would retain title and possession for 24 months, or (2) 
full payment with free rental for seller's family for 24 
months, while rejecting full payment without 24 months' free 
rental. 
The conduct of the seller in Kier resembles DeGraff 
Associates' here: both sought to avoid performance. Just as 
the Kier court refused to allow the seller to capriciously in-
voke a legal rule in order to avoid a contract he no longer 
found desirable, so this court should find in DeGraff Asso-
ciates' repudiation an assumption of the consequences of its 
wrongful behavior. A party must accept the risk of its mis-
deeds. Here that risk was that the repudiation would be 
accepted, resulting in rescission of the Option and all the 
terms thereof. 
If the Option is otherwise valid (see Point V), 
DeGraff Associates' repudiation gave Holmes several alternative 
remedies (see Point II, p. 18). 
It would indeed be anomalous to allow DeGraff Asso-
ciates to negate the Option because of its objection to an 
essential term and yet maintain that the Option is enforceable 
in other respects. A contract shorn of its payment terms is 
unenforceable in its entirety. Here the fatal indefiniteness 
was caused or contributed to by DeGraff Associates' own ac-
tions. Defendant should not be entitled to assert the validity 
of Holmes' alleged commission waiver after having repudiated 
the Option due to payment terms it found to be disadvantageous. 
( 17) 
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POINT II. THE REPUDIATION OF THE OPTION WAS TREATED AS AN 
OFFER FOR MUTUAL RESCISSION~ THE OFFER WAS ACCEPTED AND THE 
OPTION WAS DISCHARGED BY A NEW AGREEMENT. 
DeGraff Associates was given several opportunities to 
retract or withdraw the repudiation and perform the Option ac-
cording to its terms. Rather than do so, DeGraff Associates 
consistently and unequivocally refused to perform according to 
the terms of the Option. 
The innocent party to a repudiated contract has sever-
al alternative remedies. Simpson says of these: 
Upon advance repudiation, there are four alternatives 
open to the promissee: (1) to sue at once for anticipatory 
breach~ (2) to treat the repudiation as an offer for mutual 
rescission and accept it and discharge the contract; (3) to 
treat the repudiation as excusing his own further duty of 
performance and wait to sue until the breach has become an 
actual one~ (4) to ignore the repudiation and urge the pro-
missor to perform. The promissor may retract his repudia-
tion up to the time the promissee has elected any one of 
the first three alternatives, but not after. L. Simpson, 
Contracts §194 (2d ed. 1965). 
American Development Company chose the second alterna-
tive by proposing alternative terms and ultimately entering 
into a new contract with DeGraff Associates. American Develop-
ment Company changed its position by proposing and entering 
into a new agreement. DeGraff Associates was then precluded 
from retracting its repudiation. 
Simpson indicates the manner in which a contract may 
be discharged: 
A contract may be discharged by the substitution of a 
new contract. 
This results (a) By expressly substituing the new 
contract for the old one. 
(18) 
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(b) By making a new contract inconsis-
tent with the old, with new terms 
on both sides agreed upon. 
(c) By novation, in which a new party 
is substituted for one of the 
original parties by agreement of 
all three. 
Simpson, Contracts, §206 (2d ed. 1965) 
For a contract to be discharged by a new contract, the 
intention to discharge must be evident. The intention of dis-
charge is determined from the inconsistency of the new terms 
with the old ones. Simpson, Contracts, §206, p.416. The in-
tention of discharge, as with other terms of a contract, should 
be determined by what the parties intend, perhaps more gener-
ally. That is, DeGraff Associates' intention was to have a 
contract which, by its terms, paid out. DeGraff Associates' 
expressed intention was not to perform or honor the payment 
terms of the Option, which could extend perpetually. Having 
clearly repudiated an essential term, and thus the entire 
Option (see Point I) , DeGraff Associates intended to enter into 
a new agreement. This intention is also evident from the 
inconsistency of the new terms with the old ones (see Point IV, 
pp. 24-27). 
Since the Option was repudiated in its entirety, all 
of its terms became a nullity; the agreement between DeGraff 
Associates and American Development Company was contained in 
the Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 17). There is no waiver of 
Holmes' right or claim to a commission in the purchase Agree-
ment or any of the documents executed simultaneously there-
( 19) 
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with. Holmes could not be bound to any terms of an Option 
which had been repudiated. Holmes was, therefore, entitled to 
sixty percent of the total commission by virtue of the agree-
ments of Holmes and DeGraff Associates with the Multiple List-
ing Service of the Board of Realtors. 
POINT III. THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND THE DOCUMENTS EXE-
CUTED CONCURRENTLY THEREWITH CONTAINED THE PARTIES' ENTIRE 
AGREEMENT: ALL PRIOR NEGOTIATIONS OR AGREEMENTS MERGED INTO 
THE FINAL CONTRACT DOCUMENTS. 
A new agreement was negotiatied between DeGraff Asso-
ciates and American Development Company. The documents which 
embodied the agreement include: Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 17 
P), Assignment of Contract (Exhibit 19-P), Warranty Deed (Exhi-
bit 18-P), Escrow Instructions (Exhibit 20-P), and a Seller's 
and Buyer's Escrow Statement (Exhibt 22-P). These documents 
contained the parties' entire agreement, superceding and extin-
guishing all previous negotiations or agreements. This is the 
rule in Utah and has been stated in cases such as J. Henry 
Jones Company v. Smith, 27 U.2d 225, 494 P.2d 526 (Utah 1972), 
wherein the Court said: 
Where parties have discussed a business transaction 
and pursuant thereto have reduced an agreement to writing, 
it is generally to be assumed that their agreement is en-
compassed in the written document. 494 P.2d at 528. 
See also Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P.2d 769 (Utah 1951). 
In National Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Bros., Inc., 
29 U.2d 460, 511 P.2d 731 (1973), this Court stated: 
[W]here parties engage in negotiations concerning a 
transaction, pursuant to which they enter into a written 
c~ntract, it is presumed that all matters relating to the 
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subject are merged in and constitute a complete integration 
of their agreement. 511 P.2d at 733. 
Paragraph 10 of the Agreement (Exhibit 17) provides: 
"It is understood and agreed that there are no representations, 
covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto except as 
herein specifically set forth." The rule of merger or integra-
tion is particularly applicable when the final contract recites 
that it contains the entire agreement of the parties. Section 
228, Restatement, Contracts, states: 
An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto 
adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete ex-
pression of the agreement. An integration is the writing 
or writings so adopted. 
In Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 501 
P.2d 266 (1974), the Supreme Court of Utah stated the manner in 
which a question of integration is determined: 
An essential element of an integration is that the 
parties shall have manifested assent not merely to the pro-
visions of their agreement but to the writing or writings 
in question as a final statement of their intentions as to 
the matters contained therein. Whether a document was or 
was not adopted as an integration may be proved by any re-
levant evidence. 
Whenever a litigant insists that a writing that is 
before the court is an integration and asks the application 
of the parol evidence rule, the court must determine as a 
question of fact whether the parties did in fact adopt a 
particular writing or writings as the final and complete 
expression of their bargain. In determining the issue of 
the completeness of the integration in writing, evidence 
extrinsic to the writing itself is admissible. Parol test-
imony is admissible to show the circumstances under which 
the agreement was made and the purpose for which the in-
strument was executed. (Footnotes omitted.) 
The court in Tapper Chevrolet Company v. Hansen, 510 
P.2d 1091 (Ida. 1973), emphasized the importance of a merger 
clause and elaborates upon its effects. 
(21) 
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Where an agreement is reduced to writing in such terms 
as to express a complete, integrated contract, evidence of 
a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement relating to the 
same subject matter is inadmissible to vary, contradict, or 
enlarge the terms of the written contract. (Citations 
omitted.) Where preliminary negotiations culminate in an 
integrated written agreement, the writing supercedes all 
previous understandings. Id. at 1094. 
In Tapper, as here, the disputed agreement was a contract for 
the sale of land. The rule enunciated in Tapper worked to 
exclude evidence of a prior oral agreement. Evidence of a 
prior written agreement may also be excluded, whereas, evidence 
of contemporaneous written agreements is not excluded by this 
rule. Specifically, a contract of sale and escrow statements 
executed concurrently should be read together as one contract. 
Hays v. Hug, 412 P.2d 373 (Ore. 1966); Swanson v. Thurber, 281 
P.2d 642 (Cal. App. 1955); Leiter v. Sandelsman, 270 P.2d 563 
(Cal. App. 1954). 
In the case at bar the purchase Agreement was accom-
panied by a Seller's Escrow Statement signed by DeGraff Asso-
ciated, wherein it was stated that the broker's commission was 
in arbitration. Evidence as to the arbitration agreement, 
being contemporaneous and written, is not excluded by the parol 
evidence rule; on the other hand, evidence of the Option that 
no commission was due and owing is excluded for the reason that 
the entire agreement was merged into the purchase Agreement 
(Exhibit 17-P) and the documents executed contemporaneously 
therewith. 
Even assuming that the presumption of a merger could 
be rebutted, the Option would nevertheless be ineffective to 
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bar recovery of commisson for the reason that the so-called 
waiver provision was modified by the arbitration provision of 
the purchase Agreement and related documents. Holmes' basis 
for claiming a commission was not the reference to "arbitra-
tion" in the Seller's Escrow Statement, but rather his agree-
ment, together with the agreement of DeGraff Associates, with 
the Multiple Listing Service. 
The new agreement also precludes the introduction of 
evidence as to the old agreement. In Corporation Nine v. 
Taylor, 30 U.2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (1973), the Court upheld a 
lower court ruling that the purchase price as it appeared in 
the contract of sale precluded the introduction of evidence 
that the agreed upon price was something different. The Court 
predicated the correctness of this result on the parol evidence 
rule, a rule which in the case of modification can be seen as a 
bar to the introduction of evidence as to terms which in the 
new contract has replaced those of the old. 
DeGraff Associates considered the Option only prelimi-
nary to the negotiation of a more detailed agreement (Tr. 131-
32, 138-39). The documents signed at closing established an 
arrangement where DeGraff Associates would not be required to 
perform any further act so long as American Development Company 
made the payments outlined in the Agreement (Exhibit 17-P). 
The Agreement referred to the escrow to be established and to 
DeGraff Associates' delivery of a Warranty Deed to the escrow 
agent. Further, the Agreement recited that it constituted the 
entire agreement between the parties. The integrated agreement 
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of the parties, consisting of the purchase Agreement (Exhibit 
17-P) and the documents executed simultaneously therewith, 
superceded the Option. The integrated agreement does not con-
tain a waiver of a commission by Holmes. In absence of a 
waiver, Holmes is entitled to sixty percent of the commission, 
based upon the agreements with the Multiple Listing Service of 
the Board of Realtors. 
POINT IV. THE OPTION WAS RESCINDED AND DISCHARGED BY THE 
NEW AGREEMENT. 
DeGraff Associates repudiated the Option (see Point I 
above). Thereafter, DeGraff Assocates required and entered 
into an Agreement inconsistent with the terms of the Option. 
The only consistent term was that the same land was the sub-
ject of the Option and the Agreement. The total purchase price 
was possibly the same, but was expressed in different 
terms. 2 The Agreement, and documents signed concurrently 
therewith, provided the following terms or provisions, not 
mentioned in the Option: ( 1) establishment of escrow, ( 2) 
payment into escrow, {3) delivery of deed to escrow, (4) par-
2The Option (Exhibit 24-D) provided: "$7000 per acre" and 
described the property as "Approx. 205 acres." The purchase 
Agreement (Exhibit 17-P) provided: " ... Buyer does hereby 
purchase the property above described for the total purchase 
price of ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND 
no/100 DOLLARS ---- ($1,435,000.00) which amount shall be 
reduced by $7,000 per acre if actual surveyed acreage is less 
than 205 acres 
It is further of note that the purchase price exceeded 
the listing price, $1,421,170 (see reverse side of Exhibit 9-P; 
Exhibit 7-P), by nearly $14,000. 
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tial conveyance, (5) payment to Farnsworth Associates, DeGraff 
Associates' contract seller, by American Development Company, 
(6) final payment on or before September 30, 1985, (7) De-
Graff's obligation to pay off The Lockhart Company, to which 
DeGraff Associates had assigned its contract with Farnsworth 
Associates, (8) authority to subdivide, install roads, curbs, 
gutters, sidewalks, sewers and other improvements, and (9) de-
fault provision. 
In addition, several terms were changed. The Option 
provided for interest at eight percent per annum on the unpaid 
principal; the Agreement, five and three-fourths percent. The 
Option provided for a down payment of $100,000; the Agreement 
$75,000, plus the payments due Farnsworth and Associates, 
$72,164 on or before September 1 (see Exhibit 36-P). The op-
tion provided for annual payments of $100,000; the Agreement 
provided for payments of $50,000 each on or before each July 31 
and September 30 of each year, plus $72,154 due Farnsworth and 
Associates annually on or before September 1 on the contract 
between Farnsworth and Associates and DeGraff Associates (Exhi-
bit 36-P). 
There can be no question from the foregoing comparison 
that the terms of the Agreement are inconsistent with the Op-
tion. The clear intention of the parties, comparing the Option 
to the Agreement, is to rescind the Option in favor of the 
Agreement. The law on rescission by making a new contract is 
summarized in 17 Am.Jur. 2d, Contracts §493: 
( 25) 
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An agreement to rescind need not be express. Thus, a 
contract may be discharged before breach by the mere making 
of a new agreement or by the performance thereof, depending 
upon the intent of the parties. Similarly, after breach of 
the original contract the claim for damages may be dis-
charged by the performance of a new agreement or by the 
mere making of a new agreement, where that is its meaning, 
or by the acceptance of benefits under the new contract. 
So, the general rule is well settled that the parties to a 
contract may rescind it by making a new contract inconsis-
tent therewith. Primarily, however, it is a question of 
intention to be ascertained from the contracts themselves 
as to whether the earlier contract is dissolved and super-
ceded by the new contract. If the parties to a contract 
make a new and independent agreement concerning the same 
matter and the terms of the latter are so inconsistent with 
those of the former that they cannot stand together, the 
latter may be construed to discharge the former. A new 
contract between the same parties which contains nothing 
inconsistent with an older one does not discharge the 
latter. Nor does the mere recital of a prior agreement in 
a later one extinguish the earlier agreement. 
Where the new contract is consistent with the contin-
uance of the former one and only provides a new mode of 
discharging the former one, it has no effect unless or 
until it is performed. Whether the second contract is 
deemed invalid for want of consideration or is regarded as 
an accord without satisfaction, its nonperformance leaves 
the parties with their former rights and liabilities unaf-
fected. Moreover, where parties enter into a contract 
which, if valid, would have the effect, by implication, of 
rescinding a former contract and it turns out that the 
second transaction cannot operate as the parties intended, 
it does not have the effect, by implication, of affecting 
their rights in respect of the former transaction. (Foot-
notes omitted; emphasis added.) 
Further, a contract may be rescinded by acts or con-
duct of the parties. As stated in 17 Am.Jur. 2d, Contracts, 
§494: 
A contract may be rescinded or discharged by acts or 
conduct of the parties inconsistent with the continued 
existence of the contract, and mutual assent to abandon a 
contract may be inferred from the attendant circumstances 
and conduct of the parties. There is authority to the 
effect that event a contract under seal may be released, 
surrendered, or discharged by matters in pais. 
( 26) 
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While as a general rule a contract will be treated as 
abandoned or rescinded where the acts and conduct of one 
party inconsistent with its existence are acquiesced in by 
the other party, to be sufficient the acts and conduct must 
be positive and unequivocal. A contract cannot be regarded 
as abandoned if both parties in good faith continue to as-
sert contrary rights arising out of a diversity of opinion 
as to its construction. 
The intent of DeGraff Associates was ta rescind the 
Option in favor of the purchase Agreement. This intent is de-
rived from the inconsistent terms of the Agreement when com-
pared to the Option. In addition, DeGraff Associates consider~ 
ed the Option only preliminary to the negotiation of a final 
agreement (Tr. 131-32, 138-39). Upon repudiation of the Op-
tion, Holmes, and thereafter his assignee, American Development 
Company, were entitled to sue for anticipatory breach. The 
claim for damages in such an action could be discharged by 
making a new agreement. In any event, the terms of the Agree-
ment and the Option are so inconsistent that they cannot stand 
together; the Agreement, under such circumstances, must be con-
strued to discharge the Option. 
A related legal principle is rescission by abandon-
ment. In King v. Firm, 3 U.2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955), Firm 
gave King a note and mortgage to secure payment of an obliga-
tion. Firm was unable to make the payments on the note as they 
became due. Another note and mortgage, to take the place of 
the first, and which included $346 of additional costs, was 
prepared and signed. However, the mortgage was never recorded 
and King was paid the amount due under the first note, and King 
released ~he first note and mortgage. The trial court found 
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$346 was owing under the second note and mortgage. The Supreme 
Court of Utah reversed: 
Had the parties considered that the second note and mort-
gage, which was never recorded, were valid and subsisting 
instruments they would not have been described in the re-
lease by King of first note and mortgage, the debt of which 
the later instruments were supposed to have renewed, as 
"unused papers." The fact that the release was of the 
first note and mortgage and not the second after it was 
decided to pay off the debt they represented is further 
evidence of the intent and understanding of all the parties 
that the second note and mortgage were not valid instru-
ments. The mortgage being unrecorded and there being no 
question of third parties' rights here, there appears no 
logical reason why the parties could not mutually agree 
that those instruments, if valid in the first instance, 
should be cancelled or rescinded just as they would have 
been able to do in the case of an ordinary contractual 
obligation. See 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, Sec. 442, page 
1024, where it is stated: 
"It is sometimes said that a contract is con-
sidered to remain in force until it is rescinded by 
mutual consent or until the opposite party does some 
act inconsistent with the duty imposed upon him by the 
contract, which amounts to an abandonment, or that a 
contract will be treated as abandoned where the acts 
of one party inconsistent with its existence, are 
acquiesced in by the other. * * *" 
King by releasing the first mortgage and writing thereon 
that the sum paid included interest and payment of an 
attorney's fee for "unused papers" acted in a manner in-
consistent with the existence of any rights under the se-
cond note and mortgage and thereby showed that he had aban-
doned any such rights which he may have had, and certainly 
the other parties acquiesced in this. We conclude there-
fore that the parties by their acts having mutually con-
sented to abandonment of any rights unde~ the later instru-
ments, the court erred in finding that the balance of $346 
was owing under those instruments ... 
See also Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 U.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). 
The conduct of DeGraff Associates, and the terms of 
the Agreement when compared to the Option, compel the con-
clusion that DeGraff Assocates abandoned its rights, and 
liabilities, under the Option in favor of the Agreement and 
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related documents. This abandonment of the Option was ac-
quiesced in by the execution of the integrated contract, 
consisting of the Agreement and related documents. 
The discharge of the Option discharges any waiver of 
Holmes' right or claim to a commission contained in the Op-
tion. In absence of waiver, Holmes is entitled to sixty per-
cent of the commission, based upon the agreements with the 
Multiple Listing Service of the Board of Realtors. 
POINT V. THE OPTION SHOULD BE RULED VOID AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Opti?n contained terms which, if strictly follow-
ed, would never pay out the principal price. This Court has 
previously considered a case very similar to the present case. 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 15 U.2d 7, 386 P.2d 406 (1963), the 
parties entered into a conditional sales contract and escrow 
agreement, with a deed of conveyance deposited with the escrow 
agent. The payments under the contract would not pay the in-
terest that accrued on the purchase price. The Supreme Court 
of Utah held that the escrow agreement was not void because of 
the rule against perpetuities. The decision is significant 
and, therefore, quoted at length: 
It is urged that the language constitutes· an option to 
buy land. It appears only to be an option to make advance 
payments under the contract, and not to vest any title. It 
is unnecessary for us to decide what it is, since we are 
constrained to hold that the escrow agreement, taken as a 
whole, is not an option contract .... 
It is urged further that the effect of the agreement 
was to create a perpetual lease, and is therefore void. We 
need not decide the point .... [W]e think the contention 
advanced to be without merit. 
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Since we are dealing only with a contract for the sale 
of land upon performance of condition, it must be treated 
in that character in any assault upon it by the rule 
against perpetuities weapon, ··~ 
In the instant case we are not construing a deed or a 
conveyance. The deed is in escrow, under a conditional 
sales contract, looking toward delivery and resulting ac-
quisition of legal title, by virtue of such deed "conveying 
* * * title. to the * * * premises." The buyer at no time· 
acquires any legal estate under the terms of the escrow 
agreement, and it is not an interest presently cr~ated to 
take effect at a time beyond the perpetuity period, and the 
sellers~ until such time as the deed is delivered, well 
might for value convey the fee, subject to knowledge on the 
part of the grantee, in which case equities in defendant 
would arise, or lacking such knowledge, litigation would 
arise under the escrow agreement for breach. 
As to any argument that the agreement might give rise 
to an equitable interest, a point we need not decide, the 
simple answer is that admitting such urgence, such equi-
table interest would have arisen and become vested when the 
contract was executed, consequently eliminating any ques-
tion of an equitable interest vesting in futuro. 
Since the escrow agreement does not purport to convey 
a legal interest presently, to take effect at a time offen-
sive to the Rule, we conclude that the Rule is inapplicable. 
There are several distinctions between Anderson and 
the present case, although there are significant similarities. 
In Anderson, the primary agreement between the parties was a 
conditional sales contract. 3 An escrow was established 
3The distinction between an option and a conditional 
sales contract may be of minor import. In Knight v. Chamber-
lain, 6 U.2d 394, 315 P.2d 273 (1957), the plaintiff, a real 
estate broker, sued for services rendered, under an oral con-
tract in connection with a proposed program for the development 
of residential properties. The plaintiff asserted that he was 
not subject to the provisions or requirements of Section 25-5-
4(5), Utah Code Annotated, asserting that he undertook only to 
procure "options" which did not amount to "real estate" within 
the meaning of the statute. The court responded to that issue 
as follows: (Footnote 3 continued on following page.) 
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and the seller deposited a warranty deed with the escrow 
agent. In the present case, we are dealing only with an 
Option, which provides for a date of possession and "final 
conveyance by Warranty Deed." 
The rule against perpetuities is stated in Anderson as 
follows: 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
The question as to whether an option amounts to an 
interest in land is one upon which there is disagreement 
among the authorities. Some adhere to the view that it is 
merely a personal right in the optionee to call for and 
receive land if he elects to do so, dealing with which does 
not require a writing under the statute of frauds; others 
hold that an interest in land is created and such a con-
tract must be in writing to be enforceable .... 
In approaching the question: whether an option amounts 
to an interest in land, the matter of primary concern is 
the nature of the right an option represents. Once the 
optionor has, for a good consideration, agreed to and sign-
ed an option, he is bound to sell his property if the op-
tionee performs the conditions prerequisite to exercising 
it. Likewise, if he elects to do so, the optionee can per-
form, and then enforce his right to purchase and obtain 
conveyance of the property. Even before the option is 
exercised, the optionee can assert rights in the property 
by enjoining its sale to others. The rights and duties of 
the parties are thus seen to be closely analogous to those 
of buyers and sellers under conditional sales contracts, 
where land is to be conveyed upon performance by the buyer; 
and options have been so referred to. 
There is, of course, a distinction between the option-
ee and the purchaser under an ordinary real estate con-
tract, in that the. optionee need not exercise his option, 
but can forfeit his payment and not perform; whereas the 
vendee under the contract is bound. However, this differ-
ence is in no way inconsistent with the idea that an option 
is essentially a right to purchase. Due to the fact that 
the optionee does have a degree of control over the pro-
perty and the right to acquire it by performing certain 
conditions, logic seems to impel the conclusion that a 
valid option to purchase is an interest in real estate 
which would come within the terms of the above quoted 
portion of the statute of frauds. (Footnotes omitted.) 
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No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, 
not later than 21 years after some life in being at the 
creation of the interest. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 
4th ed. 1942, 191. 
In the present case, under the Option the Seller's 
obligation to make and deliver a Warranty Deed would not atise 
until the total purchase price is paid. Unless amounts were 
paid in excess of those amounts required by the Option, the 
purchase price would never be paid. Quite possibly, then, the 
Seller's obligation to make and deliver a Warranty Deed could 
arise after the period of lives in being plus 21 years. 
Arguably, the Buyer's possessory and equitable inter-
ests vest within the period of lives in being plus 21 years. 
However, the legal interest, established by conveyance by war-
ranty deed, may not be within that period and would thus appear 
to violate the rule against perpetuities. 
In Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co., 192 F.2d 597 (lOth 
Cir. 1951), the court was asked to consider the validity of an 
option to repurchase property, given under circumstances as 
though the language of option had been inserted in the deed of 
conveyance. Griffith purchased the land in question for 
$20,000.00. The warranty deed conveying the property to Grif-
fith did not contain any restrictions, limiiations or re~erva-
tions in respect to the use or disposition of the property. 
Thereafter, Morgan requested a letter giving assurance that a 
theater building would be constructed on the land. In re-
sponse, Griffith wrote a letter addressed to Morgan in which it 
was stated that the property had been purchased from him, that 
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Griffith intended to build a theater on the property, and that 
if at any time in the future Griffith should abandon such in-
tention, Morgan would be given the opportunity to repurchase 
the land at the cost to Griffith, $20,000.00. Approximately 
four years later nothing had been constructed on the property 
and Griffith received an offer of $50,000.00 for a portion of 
the property. Griffith, desired to sell that portion. Morgan 
objected on the grounds that the letter constituted a valid 
option to repurchase the entire tract if Griffith decided not 
to erect the theater building and that a sale of any part of 
the land would constitute a breach of the option. In affirming 
the trial court's determination that the letter did not create 
any enforceable right, interest, option or a claim on the land, 
the Tenth Circuit stated: 
[T]he right to purchase was not presently vested. It 
could not be exercised until such time in the future as the 
intention to construct a theater building on the land was 
abandoned. And the abandonment of that intention might 
never take place. Manifestly, the right of exercise of the 
option was not presently vested; it was contingent; and it 
was without limitation as to time for its exercise. It 
extended for an indefinite time in the future. It might 
well extend beyond life or lives and being beyond 21 
years. And it therefore contravened the rule against per-
petuities, or restraint on alienation. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit stated: "The 
interdiction of perpetuities is not a rule of construction. It 
is a peremptory command of law founded upon a sound principle 
of public policy and is to be rigidly enforced." 
The question of whether an option amounts to an inter-
est in land or is merely a personal right (see Knight v. Cham-
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berlain, footnote 3 above) would not affect the result in 
Morgan v. Griffith Realty Co. 
This Court should eliminate the types of uncertainties 
created by the contract in Anderson and the Option in the pre-
sent case. DeGraff Associates and its counsel stated that the 
Option was unenforceable because of the violation of the rule 
against perpetuities: Holmes, perhaps in reliance on Anderson, 
or perhaps because as a layman he felt the parties should be 
bound to their agreement, asserted the validity of the Option. 
Just as this Court would hold that indefinite payment terms re-
sult in an unenforceable contract (Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 
supra), this Court should eliminate the indefiniteness created 
by a perpetual payment schedule and rule the same void as a 
matter of law, being in violation of the rule against 
perpetuities. 
POINT VI. HOLMES IS ENTITLED TO SIXTY PERCENT OF THE REAL 
ESTATE COMMISSION DUE AND PAYABLE IN CONNECTION WITH 
DeGRAFF ASSOCIATES' SALE OF ITS PROPERTY 
Whether characterized as repudiation (Point I) , dis-
charge (Point II), merger or integrated agreement (Point III), 
rescission (Point IV), or in violation of the rule against 
perpetuities (Point V), the facts of this case inescapably 
require the conclusion and finding that the Option was of no 
force and effect, and any waiver of Holmes contained therein 
was not binding upon him after the repudiation or the execution 
of the substituted purchase Agreement and related documents. 
Holmes takes issue with a Finding of Fact entered by 
the trial court: 
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13. At all times the Plaintiff's agreement was in 
effect whereby no commission would be payable from the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff in connection with the subject 
property. (R. 86) 
This is really a conclusion of law, but nevertheless, as a 
finding or conclusion, is not supported by the evidence. The 
evidence is undisputed and overwhelming that the Option was 
repudiated, discharged or otherwise terminated and rendered 
void as a result of merger or integration, rescission, or the 
application of the rule against perpetuities. 
DeGraff Associates agreed to pay six percent commis-
sion upon the sale of the property (Answer to Request for Ad-
mission No. 2, R. 74). The property listed by DeGraff Asso-
ciates was sold to American Development Company within the term 
of the sales agency contract (Answer to Request for Admission 
No. 3, R. 74, Exhibit 17-P, Tr. 61). American Development Com-
pany has performed all of its obligations under the purchase 
Agreement (Tr. 52). Holmes introduced American Development 
Company to the property (Tr. 32, 157). The agreement (Exhibit 
17) between DeGraff Associates and American Development Company 
was negotiated by Bruce Holmes (Tr. 34). All of American De-
velopment Company's information regarding the property was 
through Bruce Holmes (Tr. 35). In summary, ~olmes performed 
all duties required of him to earn a commission. 
Holmes and DeGraff Associates had each signed commis-
sion split agreements with the Board of Realtors (Exhibits 3-P 
and 15-P). The agreements provide that DeGraff Associates 
would pay a selling broker sixty percent of the commission upon 
( 3 5) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the sale of a property listed by DeGraff Associates (Answer to 
Request for Admission No. 5, R. 75, Exhibits 3-P and 15-P). 
The sales price of the property was $1,435,000.00 (Exhibit 
17-P). A commission of six percent of the purchase price is 
the sum of $86,100.00. Sixty percent of that amount is the sum 
of $51,660.00. Based upon the foregoing, Holmes is entitled to 
sixty percent of the commission, or the sum of $51,660.00. 
CONCLUSION 
The Option was repudiated, discharged, rescinded, ter-
minated by a final merged and integrated contract, or was void, 
being in violation of the rule against perpetuities. The 
rights, obligations, and liabilities of DeGraff Associates and 
Holmes under the Option were terminated or discharged. Holmes 
is entitled to sixty percent of the commission payable upon 
sale of the DeGraff Associates' property, the sum of $51,660. 
It is respectfully requested that this Court reverse 
the judgment of the trial court with directions that judgment 
be entered in favor of Holmes in the amount of $51,660. 
DATED this _____ day of November, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
By 
(36) 
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Attorney for Plaintiff-
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